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Abstract:  
Online markets have dramatically decreased costs of search and communication for buyers. By contrast, costs of eva-
luating purchasing alternatives have become critical due to an overwhelming range of available options. When high, 
evaluation costs can offset potential gains from transactions and cause inefficiencies, e.g. by forcing buyers to abandon 
transactions without allocating contracts.  While most previous studies treat evaluation costs as an exogenous factor, 
this study considers them endogenous. We identify several tactics (search, request for proposal preparation, budget an-
nouncement, bid filtering, and negotiation) that buyers at online markets can use to reduce their evaluation costs and 
hence influence project allocation. Using data from nearly 10 thousand transactions at a leading online marketplace for 
IT services, we show that buyers who use these tactics are more likely to allocate their project to a winner than buyers 
not using these tactics. Buyer experience also has a positive effect on allocation and, in addition, moderates the effective-
ness of some of the tactics. As experience grows, budget announcement becomes more effective in coping with evaluation 
costs and increases the likelihood of allocation, while the effectiveness of request for proposal preparation decreases. To-
gether, these results shed more light on the buyer side of online reverse auctions, which leads to guidelines for improving 
the efficiency of online marketplaces. 
Keywords: evaluation costs, reverse auctions, online markets, IT services, outsourcing, buyer behavior, vendor 
selection. 
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1. Introduction 
While the sale of physical products over the Internet has been a mainstay of electronic commerce, in 
recent years a number of online marketplaces have sprung up that focus on the trading of profes-
sional services. They cover services from IT (e.g. website design) to construction (e.g. painting) and 
from tax advice to creative writing. One of the more vivid examples is Elance Online, a pioneer pro-
fessional services marketplace that runs around 100.000 reverse auctions for services1 yearly. An-
other example is RentACoder.com, a marketplace specialized in IT services, that facilitates over 
15.000 projects per month and still grows at the rate of 50% a year2. The field is booming, with more 
newcomers such as oDesk and OnForce joining the game (Thibodeau, 2007). 
The growth of these markets has dramatically increased the range of alternatives that are available to 
buyers. For example, when considering sourcing a service at RentACoder.com, a buyer potentially 
has over 160 thousand vendors from close to 200 countries to choose from. The exposure to an 
overwhelming range of suppliers and their offerings online can require buyers to spend more efforts 
on evaluating their options (Barua, Ravindran, & Whinston, 1997: 119), thus increasing the cost of 
transacting and reducing the efficiency of online marketplaces. Bid evaluation is particularly chal-
lenging when heterogeneous services such as software development are involved, where the services 
is typically idiosyncratic and substantial information asymmetry exists with regard to vendor quality 
and production costs (Snir & Hitt, 2003). In addition, sellers have responded to lowered search costs 
with strategies that make the evaluation more complex – by increasing product differentiation (Cle-
mons, Hann, & Hitt, 2002; Grover & Ramanlal, 1999), product bundling and multiproduct competi-
tion (Ellison & Ellison, 2005). Thus, the bid evaluation process is a non-trivial part of the exchange 
process at online marketplaces, yet only a handful of studies have recognized its importance. 
                                                 
1
 www.elance.com (accessed 25.06.2007) 
2
 www.rentacoder.com (accessed 25.06.2007) 
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This importance is demonstrated by a connection between higher evaluation costs and buyer’s ten-
dency to abandon the transaction, i.e. not allocate the project to any vendor at all (Carr, 2003; Snir et 
al., 2003). From a buyer’s perspective, as the expected costs of evaluating vendors or their offerings 
go up, at some point they may overweight the benefits of locating an efficient vendor, so that the 
buyer decides to forgo bid evaluation and quits the transaction (Carr, 2003). Empirical tests sup-
ported this conjecture by showing that as project value and the number of submitted bids increase, a 
buyer becomes less likely to allocate their IT projects at reverse auctions (Snir et al., 2003). High 
evaluation costs at least partially account for the fact that as little as 30-40% of requests for propos-
als at marketplaces such as Elance Online go past the bidding stage to the project award stage (Snir 
et al., 2003). Thus, understanding evaluation costs and perhaps more importantly, the ways to cope 
with them, is important in order to harness the complexities and opportunities of online marketplac-
es. As Barua at al. (1997) put it: “Unless buyers have effective supplier evaluation strategies, it may 
not be possible to unlock the full potential of the technology” (Barua et al., 1997: 119). 
Evaluation cost reduction is likely to increase the efficiency on the individual and market levels. 
Prior studies suggested marketplace design improvements and automatic evaluation tools to reduce 
evaluation costs (Barua et al., 1997; Snir et al., 2003). The present study adds to these institutionally-
focused factors another category of factors that impact evaluation costs – the behavior of the buyer 
in the marketplace. Whereas previous studies regarded the buyer’s behavior as uniform and fixed, we 
argue that buyers have several tactics as their disposal that they can employ to reduce evaluation 
costs. Hence our main research question is:  
“What is the effect of evaluation-cost-reducing buyer tactics on project allocation at online marketplaces for IT 
services?” 
The tactics we address are search, RFP (research for proposal) preparation, budget announcement, negotiation and 
bid filtering. The discussion of these tactics is inspired by practices that exist in custom software de-
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velopment, empirical observations at online marketplaces as well as by the literature.  Note, howev-
er, that these tactics are not exclusively used for evaluation cost reduction. For example, preliminary 
search for qualified vendors in the marketplace is widely used in many procurement settings in order 
to reduce project risk, while providing a clear project specification in an RFP is necessary to ensure 
the vendors will be able to place better-informed bids (Milgrom & Weber, 1982) and to avoid ambi-
guities during project execution. However, we will argue that an important effect of these tactics is 
to reduce the evaluation costs, which has thus far escaped recognition in the literature. Thus, the fo-
cus of our study is on the implications these tactics have for evaluation costs and the impact on 
project allocation in the context of online IT service marketplaces. Additionally, we take into ac-
count the role of buyer experience in order to assess if the effectiveness of these tactics changes as 
experience grows. 
In order to answer the research question, we conduct a quantitative examination of transactions 
from a leading online IT services marketplace. The dataset comprises approximately 10,000 reverse 
auctions. The results demonstrate that buyers employing the aforementioned tactics allocate projects 
more often than buyers who do not, as each separate tactic contributes significantly to project allo-
cation. Buyer experience moderates the effectiveness of some of the tactics: as experience grows, 
budget announcement becomes more effective in increasing the likelihood of allocation, while RFP 
preparation becomes less effective.  
The results of the analysis provide support for our conjectures that buyer tactics are an effective 
means for coping with evaluation costs. These findings contribute to the bodies of literature on on-
line marketplaces and auction theory by increasing our understanding of the relationship between 
buyer behavior, evaluation costs and contracting decisions at reverse auctions within online market-
places.  
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The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 contains a review of literature on online markets and 
reverse auctions. Section 3 presents the conceptual set up and hypotheses. In Section 4 we describe 
the empirical setting of an online marketplace for IT services, introduce measures and present the 
results of empirical tests. Section 5 and 6 contain the discussion and conclusions. 
 
2. Background literature  
2.1. Evaluation costs at online markets  
An online market is defined as “an interorganizational information system through which multiple 
buyers and sellers interact to accomplish one or more of the following market-making activities: 
identifying potential trading partners; selecting a specific partner, and executing the transaction” 
(Choudhury, Hartzel, & Konsynski, 1998). Since the early days, the costs borne by actors in eco-
nomic transactions were central to the literature online markets. Information and communication 
technologies were predicted to have drastic transaction cost-reducing effects, resulting in numerous 
implications for organizational forms, market efficiency and buyer and supplier behavior (Bakos, 
1991; Malone, Yates, & Benjamin, 1987; Malone & Laubacher, 1998). Specifically, at the level of 
buyers’ and sellers’ strategies the implications of search costs (Bakos, 1997), bidding costs (Snir et al., 
2003) and evaluation costs (Barua et al., 1997; Carr, 2003) were analyzed.  
The literature on evaluation costs, which is the focus of our study, is represented by a limited num-
ber of studies. Barua et al. (1997) were the first to address the evaluation cost issue in online mar-
kets, where the range of purchasing options for heterogeneous goods and services is greatly in-
creased. They compared two buyer strategies that are both aimed at reducing total costs of selection 
a vendor of a nonstandard product, namely a sequential evaluation strategy and a competitive bid-
ding strategy (i.e. simultaneous evaluation). The authors analytically show that buyer’s expected total 
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cost under sequential strategy is always equal or lower than that of the bidding strategy (Barua et al., 
1997). An alternative way to approach evaluation costs was proposed by Snir and Hitt (2003) who 
focused on bidder behavior in online markets and show that higher value projects attract more bid-
ders, and these bidders are of lower average quality (Snir et al., 2003). In response, Carr (2003) de-
veloped an analytical model in which bid evaluation costs are a function of the number of submitted 
bids and their average quality. As the number of bids increases, evaluation costs can become prohi-
bitively high, so that the buyer may decide to forego bid evaluation and withdraw from the auction 
altogether (Carr, 2003). This observation that evaluation costs impact project allocation is the start-
ing point for our paper and our first contribution is that we show that buyers can and do use tactics 
to reduce these evaluation costs, thus increasing project allocation rates and improving market per-
formance. Our second contribution is to provide further support for the recently emerging stream 
of empirical literature on online auctions that takes into account the heterogeneity of market partici-
pants (Bapna, Goes, Gupta, & Jin, 2004; Jap, 2007; Radkevitch, van Heck, & Koppius, 2006; Zhong 
& Wu, 2006). 
 
3. Conceptual Development 
3.1. Context: online marketplace for IT services 
Since our hypotheses are to some extent contextualized within the specific online marketplace we 
study (an issue we will address at the end of the paper in the generalizability of the results), we first 
introduce the research context – an online marketplace for IT services. Such marketplace is an ideal 
environment for our research. IT services, such as custom software development, are typically idio-
syncratic, customizable and characterized by high information asymmetry with regard to vendor 
quality (Snir et al., 2003) and production costs (Whang, 1995); therefore, these services are likely to 
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entail substantial bidding and bid evaluation costs for the exchange counterparts (Snir et al., 2003). 
Snir and Hitt (2003) provide a clear summary of exchange characteristics of IT services:  
“The RFP and bidding process must result in the exchange of much more information because projects and 
qualifications are not standardized. Unlike the trade of physical commodities where a part number, indus-
try standard (e.g., MIS-SPEC, ANSI, ISO, etc.) or short description can be sufficient to fully describe a 
good required, IT services are highly customized, and idiosyncratic. Moreover, unlike many physical com-
modities that have objective tests of quality (e.g., composition, strength, reliability, etc.), IT services face 
subjective evaluation of the work product. As such, the range of possible characteristics and quality levels of 
services is virtually unlimited” (Snir et al., 2003: 1505).  
Examples of online marketplaces that see an increasing number of contracts for IT service include 
eWork.com, Elance Online, RentACoder.com and oDesk. Contracts at these marketplaces are nor-
mally allocated via reverse auctions or bilateral negotiations (Jap, 2002; Kaufmann & Carter, 2004). 
These marketplaces also provide a platform for value-added exchange processes beyond the auction, 
such as payments, risk mitigation and service delivery (Kambil & van Heck, 2002; Snir et al., 2003). 
Due to a considerable number of small businesses and individuals outsourcing their work to low-
cost countries through these marketplaces, this segment is sometimes referred to a “person to per-
son offshoring”. The volume of this market segment is projected to increase from around USD 250 
million now to USD 2 billon by 2015 (Aggarwal, 2007). 
We illustrate the functioning of such marketplaces with the example of Elance Online – one of the 
largest online marketplace for professional services. Established in 1998, Elance now hosts around 
two thousand projects that are simultaneously open for bidding across all service categories at any 
moment of time. Around 60 thousand companies regularly use the marketplace to buy services and 
 8 
about half or more of them buy IT services3. The online market contains a searchable database of 
vendors and offers reverse auctions and negotiations as allocation mechanisms.  
The range of services available at Elance encompasses IT services, as well as other professional ser-
vices such as translation, creative writing, accounting, financial and business strategy consulting and 
the like. Buyers are businesses and individuals coming predominantly from the US. Vendors are 
mostly freelancers, small and medium IT companies from India, Eastern Europe and Russia. Some 
vendors have a turnover of more than USD two million within Elance.  
The exchange process is organized as follows: before buyers and vendors are able to enter the ex-
change, they are required to go through a registration process. Participation for buyers is free of 
charge while a periodic fee applies to vendors. The buyer starts an auction by posting an RFP. The 
buyer specifies auction parameters, such as start and end time, auction type and the type of suppliers 
who can bid.  
After the auction starts, vendors can bid. Bids specify price and estimated delivery time, contain in-
formation on vendor rating and earnings and a text field where the bidder can provide other relevant 
information. Once a bid has been submitted, it becomes visible to the buyer and other vendors. 
During the auction, the buyer can decline or shortlist bids and communicate with vendors via mes-
sage boards.  
There is no obligation for the buyer to allocate the project to any of the vendors, which results in 
quite a low project allocation rate of 30-40% (Snir et al., 2003). When a project is allocated, the par-
ties can use a virtual “working space” to communicate, exchange documents, track milestones, and 
settle payments via an escrow account. Upon project completion, the buyer can assign a rating to the 
vendor. 
 
                                                 
3
 http://www.informationweek.com/story/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=166401742  
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3.2. Costly bid evaluation in the market for IT services 
As discussed above, the exchange of IT services is likely to entail substantial evaluation costs. Evalu-
ation costs are defined as “the cost of resources used to scrutinize possible voluminous bid documentation or pro-
posals from sellers, to assess the capability of each seller, and to compare prices and other aspects of the proposals” (Ba-
rua et al., 1997: 123). The level of evaluation costs depends on the products or services involved – it 
goes up when they are nonstandard, customizable and idiosyncratic (Barua et al., 1997; Snir et al., 
2003). Additionally, as the number of inefficient suppliers in the pool increases, the buyer’s total 
evaluation costs also go up. These high evaluation costs in turn burden the exchange process with 
inefficiencies. Evaluation costs can grow as high as to “offset any gains from the reduced cost of 
search and communication” (Barua et al., 1997: 124) and “perfectly acceptable bids” can be neg-
lected by the buyer due to high expected evaluation costs (Carr, 2003: 1521). Carr’s (2003) model 
specifically addresses the exchange at online marketplaces for IT services. In this model the buyer 
starts a reverse auction by posting a request for proposals (RFP) to an auction site. Heterogeneous 
(in quality) vendors evaluate the RFP and decide, wither or not to submit their bids. When the auc-
tion ends, the buyer decides whether or not to undertake costly bid evaluation, which is necessary to 
determine the best vendor. The evaluation costs are incurred to assess vendor quality, which is pri-
vate information. The model assumes that the buyer evaluates all bids or none. The buyer’s decision 
whether or not to evaluate bids is a function of the number of submitted bids and the distribution of 
the vector of bids. With this information, the buyer can estimate conditional probability distribution 
of the lowest bid and calculate his expected post-evaluation surplus, which determines the optimal 
evaluation decision. The implications of this model have to be considered in the context of the in-
sights from the model of costly bidding (Snir et al., 2003). In this model, higher value projects attract 
more bidders, and the average quality of these bidders becomes lower. As the buyer faces more bids, 
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which are of lower average quality, he is likely to forego the evaluation due to high expected costs 
(Carr, 2003).  
 
3.3. Coping with evaluation costs  
The previous paragraph highlighted the importance of evaluation costs for buyers, but there are sev-
eral tactics that buyers can employ to reduce their evaluation costs. The discussion of these tactics is 
inspired by practices that exist in the field of custom software development, by empirical observa-
tions at online IT marketplaces as well as by the literature (Elmaghraby, 2007; Kaufmann et al., 
2004). In the discussion of the tactics we assume that in procurement situations reverse auctions are 
embedded into a sourcing context that encompasses activities such as search for vendors, short-
listing suppliers, post-auction negotiations, etc (Kaufmann et al., 2004). The tactics we consider are 
search (for vendors), RFP preparation, budget announcement, bid filtering and negotiation with 
vendors. Figure 1 depicts these tactics placed along the timeline of a typical reverse auction event at 
online IT service marketplaces. The displayed sequence is rather indicative, as in a real situation the 
buyer can decide to search for more vendors after auction start or award his contract prior to the 
scheduled auction end.  
Such tactics are widely used in procurement (Elmaghraby, 2007; Nam, Rajagopalan, Rao, & Chaud-
hury, 1996) and do not exclusively serve for the evaluation cost reduction4. Indeed, preparing a clear 
project description in an RFP is necessary to make sure the vendors will be submitting bids for the 
right project; in B2B transactions identifying qualified suppliers in advance is important as the scale 
of transactions greatly exceeds that of the retail transactions (Barua et al., 1997; Pinker, Seidmann, & 
Vakrat, 2003), therefore search is commonly used in many procurement settings (Pinker et al., 2003); 
                                                 
4
 This raises the issue of alternative explanation of the effects of these tactics. The alternative explanations are addressed in the 
Discussion section. 
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budget announcement usually takes the form of an auction reservation price (Bakos, 1997); screen-
ing vendor and/or their offers (which we denote bid filtering) as well as negotiations are necessary 
steps in tenders to ensure the fit between the project and selected vendors (Mithas & Jones, 2007).  
Search
Auction start Auction end
RFP 
preparation
Bid filtering and 
Negotiation
Award 
decision
Budget 
announcement 
 
Figure 1. The use of buyer tactics along the timeline of the sourcing process at an online 
marketplace for IT services. 
 
In order to facilitate the theoretical discussion, we draw a distinction between two aspects of evalua-
tion costs: the cumulative cost and the unit cost. The cumulative cost of evaluation goes up with assess-
ment of every additional vendor or bid. This is the overall cost the buyer incurs for evaluating all 
bids in the auction in the models by Barua et al (1997) and Carr (2003) and in the sequential strategy 
in Barua et al (1997). The unit cost of evaluation is the amount of resources and efforts invested by 
the buyer to evaluate a fixed amount of information, e.g. quality of a single vendor or bid. By in-
creasing evaluation efficiency the buyer can reduce the unit cost of evaluation. In Carr’s and Barua et 
al.’s analytical models, the unit cost of evaluation is strictly exogenous, while in the present study we 
hold both aspects of evaluation costs endogenous, so in our setting the buyer can influence both 
aspects of evaluation costs through the use of several tactics, which influences the total costs he in-
curs at the evaluation stage. 
Below we discuss effects of the five buyer tactics on two aspects of evaluation costs within the con-
text of an online auction for IT services. Through their impact on evaluation costs, the tactics and 
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experience affect the contracting decision, i.e. whether to allocate a contract to a vendor or not. As it 
is difficult to observe actual evaluation costs empirically outside a laboratory setting, we therefore 
focus on the direct implication of evaluations costs as described in previous literature (Barua et al., 
1997; Carr, 2003; Snir et al., 2003) – the relationship between the use of tactics (potentially moder-
ated by experience) and the likelihood of project allocation.  
 
3.4. Hypotheses  
Search for vendors  
The functionality of an online marketplace often allows for leveraging search in an extremely cost-
effective fashion. The buyer can browse the database of accomplished projects or search through a 
catalogue of vendor profiles in order to locate the necessary skills or vendors with the highest rank-
ing. Once located, vendors can be personally invited to bid.  
The motivation to perform search before the auction is as follows. The buyer is running a risk that 
efficient vendors may choose not to bid due to high expected bidding costs (Michell & Fitzgerald, 
1997) or simply will not be aware of the opportunity. When invited personally, the vendors are likely 
to have a higher estimation of their own probability to win and would be more likely to bid.  
There are two ways in which search can reduce buyer’s cumulative evaluation costs. First, when inef-
ficient suppliers decide whether to submit their bids, the presence of already submitted bids from 
their more efficient (and invited) counterparts may prevent them from so (Snir et al., 2003). Second, 
in case invited suppliers accept buyer’s invitation and submit their bids, the buyer might subsequent-
ly focus on bids from these vendors (and ignore other bids) as the invited vendors have been already 
favorably assessed at the search stage.  
As evaluation costs decrease in the result of search, the likelihood of buyer deciding to forego evalu-
ation also decreases. There, we formulate our first hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 1. More search for vendors will increase project allocation likelihood. 
 
Budget announcement 
The use of the announcement mechanism was suggested by (Carr, 2003) to enable the buyer to 
minimize evaluation costs when using the bidding mechanism. By the means of announcement me-
chanism the buyer “sets a minimum acceptable level of attributes such as delivery time, service 
backup and maintenance requirements, coupled with a maximum acceptable price” (Barua et al., 
1997: 130). It is expected that inefficient suppliers will refrain from submitting their bids once high 
quality/price requirements are announced. Announcement mechanism “can induce a separation be-
tween “efficient” and “inefficient” suppliers” (Barua et al., 1997: 130). Reducing bidding from ineffi-
cient vendors results in lower cumulative evaluation costs for the buyer.  
Online service marketplaces use a particular instance of announcement mechanism – they provide 
buyers with an option to declare the range of budget they expect to spend on the project. Linking 
this to buyer’s contracting decision, the hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 2. Budget announcement increases project allocation likelihood. 
 
RFP preparation  
We define RFP preparation as efforts undertaken by the buyer to describe his project. Before start-
ing an auction, the buyer typically needs to invest some efforts to describe the project in an RFP. As 
IT projects can be idiosyncratic, customizable and codifiable to a high extent, the lack of preparation 
efforts can result in ambiguities with regard to project scope and contents. As a result, suppliers 
might submit ambiguous bids or propose their own approaches to the project. Such bids are likely to 
be more costly to evaluate. By contrast, a complete, clear and comprehensive project description is 
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likely to produce more structured bids that are less costly to evaluate. Therefore, we argue that better 
prepared RFPs bring down the cost of a unit of evaluation. 
In addition, an RFP can contain requirements to vendor qualification or maximum price, similar to 
the announcement mechanism above. This reduces the cumulative costs of evaluation. 
As decreasing evaluation costs make it more likely that the buyer decides to evaluate the bids, our 
hypothesis is as follows:  
Hypothesis 3. More intensive RFP preparation will increase project allocation likelihood. 
 
Negotiation   
In the case of idiosyncratic IT projects with low codifiability, the buyer might need an input from 
the vendor (Barua et al., 1997; Lovelock, 1983) to make the project specification more complete 
(Banerjee & Duflo, 2000; Lovelock, 1983). Negotiation between the parties about the project may 
result in mutual adaptation – the buyer adapting his project description in accordance to the ven-
dor’s input and vendor adapting his bid to the updated project description.  
A result of such communication may be foregoing the evaluation of other submitted bids and focus-
ing on vendors with whom buyer has communicated, leading to a decrease of cumulative evaluation 
costs. The hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 4. Negotiation with bidders will increase project allocation likelihood  
 
Bid Filtering 
As opposed to bid evaluation, bid filtering is a tactic of excluding bids from the consideration set. 
The buyer does not have to thoroughly assess bids to decide which one needs to be excluded. Simi-
lar to search, the buyer can focus just on one parameter, such as vendor’s rating, proposed delivery 
time or price. By utilizing bid filtering for excluding bids from inefficient vendors from the consid-
 15 
eration set, the buyer is able to reduce his subsequent cumulative evaluation costs. Our hypothesis, 
therefore, is formulated in the following way: 
Hypothesis 5. More bid filtering will increase project allocation likelihood. 
 
The impact of buyer experience on the effectiveness of tactics 
Apart from the tactics, another aspect of buyer behavior is experience. The broad reach of the In-
ternet makes heterogeneity of auction participants very likely, in particular with regard to the level of 
their expertise (Bapna et al., 2004). Such heterogeneity potentially has an effect on auction out-
comes, as the knowledge about product valuation and bidding process may differ across participants. 
Therefore, we incorporate the discussion of experience into our analysis. 
Buyer 
experience
Negotiation
RFP preparation
Search
Bid filtering
Budget 
announcement
Project 
allocation
H1-H5
H6
 
Figure 2. Conceptual framework. The impact of the buyer’s evaluation costs-reducing tac-
tics on project allocation, moderated by buyer’s experience.  
 
Buyer experience represents the outcome of learning from previous transactions at the online mar-
ketplace. This learning is likely to lead to the formation of efficient patterns or approaches to evalua-
tion and familiarity with some vendors (e.g. the buyer might be able to early recognize inefficient 
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vendors whose bids can be ignored). In addition, an experienced buyer is likely to have higher tech-
nical and commercial expertise than his less experienced counterparts. It is quite straightforward to 
suggest that as buyer learns over the course of transactions, the effectiveness of the cost-reducing 
tactics should increase. With more experience, the buyer should be able to locate more appropriate 
vendors as a result of search; prepare more complete and professional RFPs; have a more precise 
estimation of the budget and estimate the price/quality trade-off; become more effective in negotiat-
ing with suppliers and filtering bids. Therefore, we hypothesize that the effect of tactics on evalua-
tion costs and project allocation goes up as buyer experience increases.  
Hypotheses 6. More buyer experience will increase the effectiveness of the five buyer’s evaluation cost-reducing tactics.  
The hypotheses are summarized in Figure 2. In the next section we discuss data and measures em-
ployed for empirical testing as well as results of the analysis.  
 
4. Data and Analysis 
4.1. Data 
The data for the empirical analysis was collected from a leading online marketplace for professional 
services similar to the one discussed in Section 3.1. This site has been chosen for several reasons. 
First, it was one of the first entrants into this new industry in the late 1990s and by now has accumu-
lated a large pool of buyers and vendors, which results in around 100 thousand RFPs posted yearly 
across all service categories. Second, IT services represent the most active and populated area of the 
marketplace. Third, the way exchange is organized at the marketplace is typical for the industry as 
described in Section 3.1, which allows for greater generalizability to the industry-level.  
We focused on transactions from one subcategory – Web Development, which is the most populated 
and active at the marketplace. This category includes 13 sub-categories: Web Design & Develop-
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ment, Other - Website Development, Web Programming, Online Forms & Database Integration, 
Ecommerce Website, Simple Website, Search Engine Optimization, HTML Email Design, Web 
Hosting, Internet Marketing, Flash MX, Usability & Interface Design, Flash Animation. We ob-
tained data on auctions that started between March and September 2005 and finished not later than 
September, 14, 2005. The data collection was carried out with the help of a software tool, Kapow 
Robosuite, that allowed programming an intelligent agent to collect information about individual 
auction events, process exceptions in the data and store information in a format appropriate for 
analysis. The initial dataset contained 16,597 observations. 
From this starting set, we excluded auctions that had missing data on project value. This left us with 
13,165 auctions in the dataset. Next, we removed observations with extreme project values – below 
USD 100 (342 auctions) or above 20,000 (8 auctions). After that projects with very short project de-
scriptions (below 5 words) were removed. Descriptions of this kind mostly refer to discussions be-
tween buyer and a vendor and before starting the auction (e.g. “As per our discussion”). There were 
1,078 projects like this. We also removed invite-only auctions, as these are, in fact, negotiations where 
normally only one vendor is invited. Finally, after removing a number of exact duplicate auctions 
(which were an unexpected outcome of the data collection procedure), we were left with 9,863 auc-
tions in the final dataset.  
 
4.2. Measures  
In this section we present the measures for independent, dependent and control variables. 
Contract allocation 
Contract award. Our dependent variable is whether or not the buyer awarded a contract as a result 
of an auction,, i.e. selected an auction winner. This was determined by the presence of a sign “Win-
ner” next to the bid description in a finished auction. In some cases, more than one vendor can be 
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selected as winner in one auction (e.g. when the buyer wants to split the work between several ven-
dors). When this is the case we still count this as one award. 
Search for vendors 
Invited suppliers. When a buyer searches for a potentially suitable vendor and finds one or more, 
those vendors are sent an electronic invitation to bid, which they may or may not accept. If one or 
more of the invited vendors accepts and places a bid, their presence is indicated on the web pages 
with a special “Invited”-tag. We model the number of invited vendors as a proxy that reflects the 
effort spent on search.  
RFP preparation 
The use of RFP preparation tactic is captured by two proxies – the length of project description and 
the presence of files attached to project description, reflecting the RFP format that is used at the 
marketplace. 
Length of project description in RFP. We use the length of project description in words as a proxy 
for buyer efforts to specify her request. A similar measure, the length of statement of work in pages, 
has been used as an indication of project value and for IT project value and complexity before in 
(Mayer & Argyres, 2004). We model it as a continuous variable. 
Attached files. A buyer can supply additional project details in files attached to the RFP. Manual ex-
amination of around two hundred auctions revealed that attached files tend to contain mostly ex-
tended text descriptions, samples of programming code, drawings etc. This indicates additional ef-
forts invested by the buyer in detailing the project. We consider attached files as evidence of efforts 
invested in the project specification and model it as a dummy variable. 
Budget announcement  
Budget announcement. At the investigated marketplace, the only attribute the buyer can explicitly 
specify outside the RFP text as a benchmark is price. In particular, the buyer can specify the budget 
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within which he expects bids by choosing it from a scroll-down menu, e.g. “below 250”, “between 
250 and 500”, “between 5,000 and 7,500”, etc. The use of the budget announcement is modelled as 
a dummy variable, indicating the presence of a budget estimate.  
Negotiation  
Negotiation. During the auction, negotiation between buyers and vendors is enabled via a message 
board. As discussed in the Hypotheses section, negotiation may result in vendors updating their bids 
in response to new information. By manually examining nearly two hundred auctions we identified 
five phrases that are most widely used to refer to bilateral message board discussions in the bid text. 
These are phrases: “as per PMB”, “as agreed”, “thank you for your answer”, “as per discussion”, or 
“as discussed”. The use of negotiation tactic is modelled through a dummy variable, based on 
whether one or more of bids in a given auction contain any of these phrases in the bid text field. 
Bid Filtering  
Declined bids. When reviewing submitted bids the buyer has an option to “decline” some of the 
bids, which means that they are removed from the list of bids. This measure is modelled as the total 
number of declined bids.  
Experience 
Finally, buyer experience is modeled via the number of previously awarded projects at the market-
place, since this indicates that the buyer has gone through the whole cycle of awarding and complet-
ing the project, which represents the best opportunity for learning.  
Previously awarded projects. The page with auction details indicates the number of projects that the 
buyer allocated at the marketplace prior to the current auction. One potential inaccuracy in that 
measure is that a buyer who allocated four projects at four different auction events will have the 
same level of experience as a buyer who allocated four projects in a single auction and left other 
three auctions without awarding and thus would have somewhat less opportunity for learning from 
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the experience with the auction phase of the project compared to the buyer with four separate 
awarded auctions. However, the correlation of the number of awarded projects with the number of 
posted projects is very high, 0.923*** at p<0.01, which means that any potential bias should not be 
substantial.  
Control variables  
Project value. To estimate the project value we relied primarily on average bid, in line with one of 
the measures Snir and Hitt (2003) used. In case auctions had a “sealed” status, i.e. the value of the 
average bid was not disclosed, we used winner’s bid as a proxy for project value5. When neither av-
erage bid nor winner bid was available, occasionally information on the actual price paid by the 
buyer for the accomplished project was available and used as the proxy for project value.  
Auction duration. Time (in days) from start until end of the auction. In case the project is allocated 
to a vendor before the specified auction end, the end date is updated automatically.  
 
4.3. Data analysis and results 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the key variables. The analysis of this table provides inter-
esting insights. There is evidence that the marketplace is highly competitive, which can be seen from 
the average number of bids submitted in an auction (14.4; median is 11) as well as from the fact that 
the mean winning bid (USD 452) is 39% lower than the average bid (USD 740).  
The mean project value of USD 740 is on the small side of typical projects in software development 
industry (which is understandable if we remember that the majority of buyers and sellers at the mar-
ketplace represent small business and freelancers6). It seems intuitively plausible that for a buyer of 
                                                 
5
 In fact, in the whole dataset there were just 16 sealed projects where details on winner’s bid were available. Perhaps, this 
represents an irreguliarity in the marketplace design, as usually in sealed auction neither winner’s bid nor other bids can be seen. 
6
 An additional reason for the modest value of the projects can be that most bidders come from low-cost counties such as India, 
China or Russia. The hourly cost of IT workforce may be as low as USD 5-15/ hour – several times lower than in developed 
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such a project, committing time (and other resources, if applicable) to evaluate in-depth around 14 
bids (in an average project) as well as the quality and experience of the vendors behind these bids 
might be uneconomical. It is not surprising, therefore, that only slightly less than half of auctions in 
our dataset (48%) end up with buyer allocating the project to a vendor.  
Budget announcement is by far the most popular of the hypothesized cost-reducing tactics – it is 
used in 50% auctions compared to search (33%), bid filtering (25%), attached files (17%) and nego-
tiation (12%). Average length of project description in an RFP is around 140 words. Around 17% of 
RFPs contain attached files with additional information about the request.  
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for the dataset of 9,863 reverse auctions. 
 Mean Std. deviation Median 
Number of bids 14.4 11.9 11 
Project value, USD 740 1,193 401 
Auction length, hours 150 253 95 
Average rating (scale 0-5) 4.59 0.66 4.7 
Contract awarded  0.48 0.50 0 
Winning bid, USD 452 803 225 
Invited suppliers (1 if utilized) 0.33 0.47 0 
Invited suppliers 1.8 4.1 0 
Length of project description, words 139 116 105 
Attached files 0.17 0.38 0 
Budget announcement  0.5 0.5 1 
Declined bids (1 if utilized) 0.25 0.43 0 
Declined bids, number  1.5 4.6 0 
Negotiation  0.12 0.37 0 
Previously posted projects 15.4 27.5 6 
Previously awarded projects  9.2 18.3 3 
                                                                                                                                                             
countries. Therefore, the cost of similar projects executed between customers and vendors in developed countries can be several 
times higher than the price at the online marketplace.  
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When looking at the median statistics of previously posted (6) and awarded projects (3) we can see 
that the majority of buyers at the marketplace have posted and carried out multiple projects, giving 
them opportunity to build up experience and potentially learn how to use the tactics effectively. Ap-
pendix 1 shows the cross-correlations between the variables in the models, which exhibit no signs of 
potential multicollinearity problems.  
We test our hypotheses with a logit regression model, similar to the one used by Snir et al., 20037, 
and following their analytical results, we omit the number of bids and average rating from the re-
gression as these are dependent on project value, which is accounted for. Thus, our base model with 
all the measures and proxies for buyer tactics has the following form:  
 )_ln()ln()_ln()_ln()Pr( 43210 lengthndescriptio_suppliersinviteddurationprojectvalueprojectAi   
ibidsDeclinedionCommunicatntannouncemeBudgetAttached   )_ln(_ 8765  (1) 
In the regression model we used natural logs of the continuous variables to ensure a normalized dis-
tribution. The second model adds the interaction effects of the tactics with experience to model (1). 
The results of both regression analyses are presented in Table 2, with the Nagelkerke R2 of both 
models suggesting that a reasonable amount of variation is explained by the base model, as well as 
the addition of the interaction effects with experience. The two control variables, project value and 
auction duration, both have a negative, significant effect on project allocation (-0.246 and -0.624, 
both at p<.01), in accordance with previous results (Snir & Hitt, 2003).  
The coefficient for ln(invited suppliers) is positive and weakly significant (β=0.052 at p<0.1) in the 
base model, and although the positive direction remains when the interaction effects are added, the 
effect becomes insignificant in model (2), leading us to conclude that positive impact of search for 
vendors on project allocation (Hypothesis 1) is marginal at best.  
 
                                                 
7
 In order to additionally validate our dataset and results, we have replicated the analysis in Table 4 of Snir and Hitt (2003) and 
found similar results. The details are available from the authors upon request.  
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Table 2. The effect of buyer tactics on the increase of award probability: logit regressions 
and the marginal effect of changes in independent variables. 
Variable 
(1) 
 
(2) 
Δ Independent 
variable 
(3) 
Δ Award 
probability 
(4) 
Constant 4.168*** (0.206) 3.295***  (0.257)   
ln(project value)  -0.301*** (0.026) -0.246*** (0.026)    
ln(auction duration) -0.647*** (0.023) -0.624*** (0.023)   
ln(invited suppliers) 0.052* (0.027) 0.044 (0.038) (M - St Dev.) to M 
M to (M + St Dev.) 
1.1% 
1.1% 
ln(description length) 0.016 (0.028) 0.018 (0.041) (M - St. Dev.) to M 
M to (M + St Dev.) 
1.8% 
1.8% 
Attached files 0.424*** (0.059) 0.492*** (0.087) 0 to 1 10.5% 
Budget announcement  0.087* (0.046) 0.069 (0.067) 0 to 1 2.1% 
Negotiation 0.875*** (0.065) 0.898*** (0.092) 0 to 1 21.4% 
ln(declined ) 0.436*** (0.031) 0.484*** (0.042) (M - St. Dev.) to M 
M to (M + St Dev.) 
7.7% 
8.0% 
ln(awarded projects)  0.293*** (0.108)   
ln(invited suppliers) X 
ln(awarded projects) 
 
0.037 (0.024) 
  
ln(description length) X 
ln(awarded projects) 
 -0.002 (0.023)   
Attached files X 
ln(awarded projects) 
 -0.082* (0.048) (M - St. Dev.) to M 
M to (M + St Dev.) 
6.6% 
6.6% 
Budget announcement X 
ln(awarded projects)  
 0.085** (0.036) (M - St. Dev.) to M 
M to (M + St Dev.) 
11.5% 
11.9% 
Negotation X ln(awarded 
projects) 
 -0.026 (0.054)   
ln(declined ) X 
ln(awarded projects) 
 -0.023 (0.028)   
N  9,863 9,863   
-2Log L  11,848 11,531   
Nagelkerke R2  0.224 0.259   
Notes:  Dependent variable – probability of a project allocation. Standard errors are in parentheses. The changes in the 
independent variables provided in columns “Δ Independent variable” and “Δ award probability” are based on the 
coefficients of the full model, i.e. model (2), including those for the insignificant direct effects for illustrative purposes.  
*p<0.1, ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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To further assess the practical effect of the independent variables on project allocation, we evaluate 
the effect of the marginal increase in each variable on the award probability, reported in columns (3) 
and (4). As pointed out in Hoetker (2007), a common approach for estimation of such effect is to 
calculate the effect for a number of sets of “theoretically interesting and empirically relevant values 
of the variables” (Hoetker, 2007: 335). For continuous variables one of the widely used approaches 
is to fix their values at the levels of one standard deviation below and above the mean. Therefore, 
we calculate the effect of the increase of ln(invited suppliers) from the mean minus one standard 
deviation (M – St. Dev.) to the mean and from the to the mean plus one standard deviation (M + St. 
Dev.). To carry out this estimation, all dummy variables in the model were fixed to zero, while all 
other continuous variables were set to their means8. The increase in ln(invited suppliers) by one 
standard deviation as per model 2, Table 2 results in an 1.1% increase of award probability in each 
of the two intervals (Table 2, columns 3 and 4). In terms of the number of vendors, this would be 
equivalent to inviting an additional 0.64, 1.47 and 3.39 vendors to the auction respectively. Although 
obviously in real world auctions only an integer number of bidders can be invited, these figures are 
helpful in illustrating the practical implications of the results.  
Hypothesis 2 (request for proposal preparation) finds partial support by the data in column 2 of Ta-
ble 2. The coefficient for the dummy Attached files is significant and has the expected sign, indicat-
ing a positive effect on project allocation. Attaching a file to RFP description results in an increase 
of award probability by 10.5% (Table 2, columns 3 and 4). However, the coefficient for description 
length is not significant. In a followup investigation, we observed that a substantial part of project 
descriptions on the lower end of the range, although longer than our initial conservative cutoff of 5 
words, still do not provide any detailed description per se; instead, they may contain a link to a web-
site the buyer wishes to clone or a reference to a software product or a discussion between the buyer 
                                                 
8
 The same approach was used in all other subsequent assessments of the effects of (marginal) parameter changes on the award 
probability in the paper. 
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and the vendor. To further investigate this, we re-ran the model on a sub-sample with an increased 
RFP description cut-off length of 10 words instead of 5. The coefficient for description length is 
positive and significant (β=0.052 at p<0.001), without substantially changing the other coefficients. 
Although admittedly a slightly ad hoc test, it does provide support to the hypothesis that investing 
efforts into RFP preparation increases project allocation likelihood by decreasing evaluation costs. 
The marginal effect of the increase of ln(description length) from one St. Dev. below mean to mean 
is 0.018, as is the effect from mean to one St. Dev., which means an 1.8% decrease/increase in 
award probability. In terms of the number of words, this is equivalent to extending the description 
from approximately 44 words to 101 to 234 words. 
Hypothesis 3 (budget announcement) also finds marginal support from the test results: budget an-
nouncement has a weak influence on the auction outcome as a main effect (β=0.087 at p<0.1), but 
this becomes insignificant once the interaction effects are added. The effect of budget announce-
ment on award probability showed that a buyer who specifies his budget level would be 2.1% more 
likely to award the project than the buyer who does not). 
Hypotheses 4 and 5 on bid filtering and negotiation both find strong support by the results of the 
regression analysis (β=0.484 and β=0.898, both p<0.001). Buyers utilizing bid filtering and negotiat-
ing with the vendors during the auction are more likely to award projects than those who do not. 
The effect of using negotiation corresponds to a 21.4% increase in project allocation probability. 
Since bid filtering is operationalized by a continuous variable, we measure its effect from the mean 
minus one standard deviation to the mean as well as from the mean to the mean plus one standard 
deviation. In terms of the number of declined bids, this is equivalent to an increase from 0.64 to 
1.35 to 2.83, which increases award probability by 7.7% and 8% respectively. 
Finally, we test Hypothesis 6 (the effect of buyer experience on the effectiveness of cost-reducing 
tactics). As model (2) shows, experience moderates the effectiveness of two of the five tactics. The 
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effect for budget announcement is positive (β=0.085 at p<0.05) but the effect for RFP preparation 
(more precisely – for Attached files) is negative (-0.082 at p<0.1), which is contrary to expectations. 
EFFECT OF BUYER EXPERIENCE ON TACTICS 
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Figure 3. The effect of the interaction between buyer experience and individual tactics on 
project award likelihood. “Experience only” means that dummy variables are set to 0, while 
other variables are set to their means.  
 
We again calculate the effects of the marginal increase of experience on the probability of award at 
several theoretically meaningful sets of values (Hoetker, 2007; Jaccard, 2001). Using RFP preparation 
with increased experience results in decreasing effectiveness, as the positive effect of RFP prepara-
tion on award likelihood goes down from 10.5% to approximately 6.6% as ln(awarded) goes up 
from the mean minus one St. Dev. to mean and from the mean to the mean plus one St. Dev. By 
contrast, as experience increases, the positive effect of budget announcement grows from 2.1% to 
an 11.5% increase in award likelihood at the first St. Dev. of ln(awarded projects) increase and 
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11.9% at the second St. Dev. of increase. These results are illustrated graphically at Fig 39. We con-
clude that buyer experience increases the effectiveness of budget announcement, while at the same 
time it decreases the effectiveness of RFP preparation, although the combined effect remains posi-
tive, as experience by itself has a strong positive main effect on project allocation. The experience 
that buyers accumulate thus translates into a better judgment of the expected project costs, reducing 
the need to extensively evaluate bids outside this cost range, and leading to increased project alloca-
tion.  
 
5. Discussion and limitations  
5.1. Discussion of the findings  
In the present study we extended the body of knowledge on an important factor in online transac-
tions – the costs buyers incur to evaluate purchasing alternatives, which encompasses the evaluation 
of vendors (e.g. vendor quality) and their offerings (bids). We treated evaluation costs as an endo-
genous factor of buyer behavior and discussed several tactics that are likely to affect buyer’s project 
allocation decision via the reduction of associated evaluation costs.  
The empirical testing with the transaction data from a leading marketplace for IT services produced 
substantial evidence in support of the hypothesized effects. The hypotheses on the positive impact 
of search, budget announcement, negotiation and bid filtering were unambiguously supported. The 
support for the positive effect of RFP preparation on project allocation likelihood is more nuanced 
– while the presence of attached files is positively associated with allocation likelihood, the descrip-
tion length becomes positive and significant only for description lengths above a minimal threshold 
of 10 words. The findings on the effect of buyer experience on the effectiveness of buyer tactics 
                                                 
9
 In case of ,ln(awarded projects), mean – 1 St.Dev, mean and mean + 1 St. Dev. are  are equivalent to awarding 0.04, 3.56 and 
7.01 projects.  
 28 
have confirmed only part of our expectations. In addition to a positive main effect, experience in-
creases the effectiveness of Budget announcement, but reduced the effect of attaching files to the 
RFP. A possible explanation for this unexpected result might be that with experience, relationships 
develop with a subset of suppliers, which could lessen the need for extensive a priori project docu-
mentation for those suppliers. Given the somewhat more complicated effects of experience, an al-
ternative option for examining the relationship between buyer experience and the tactics would be 
to assess the effect of buyer experience on the use of tactics, rather than on their effectiveness with re-
gard to increasing allocation likelihood. However, we found that the use of tactics does not vary 
substantially between experienced and inexperienced buyers10.  
However, there are a few potential alternative explanations for our results that need to be ruled out. 
We operationalized search through the presence of invited suppliers. However, an invitation to bid 
can be a result of buyer’s previous experience with the vendor, i.e. more out of habit than specific 
search. In order to rule out this option, we tested our model on a subset of projects where none of 
bidders had previously won a project from the buyer who posted that project. The regression coeffi-
cient for ln(invited suppliers) was again positive and significant (β=0.056 at p<0.05; full details of 
the regression are available from the authors), thus providing evidence that the observed positive 
effect for search does not result from the existence of prior ties between buyer and supplier (the 
winner), but rather from an active a priori search for fitting suppliers. 
Also, we need to ensure that the observed effects are indeed the result of decreasing buyers’ evalua-
tion costs, rather than some other consequences of the tactics use, because as noted in the introduc-
tion, most of the tactics also serve additional purposes. At this point it is useful to make a distinction 
between ex-ante buyer tactics, such as search, RFP preparation and budget announcement that are 
                                                 
10
 For instance, buyers with less than 1, less than 5 and more than 5 awarded projects have, respectively, the following means of 
tactics use: 0.16, 0.17 and 0.19 for attached files; 4.65, 4.64 and 4.57 for ln(description length) ; 0.11, 0.12 and 0.14 for 
negotiations; 0.53, 0.53 and 0.48 for budget announcement; 0.32, 0.33 and 0.32 for search; 0.26, 0.26 and 0.22 for declined 
bids. 
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used prior to project posting and ex-post tactics, such as negotiations and bid filtering that are em-
ployed after the auction is started (see also Fig.1). If, as we claim, one of the goals of the tactics is to 
reduce the evaluation costs, we should expect to see a negative effect of most ex ante tactics on the 
number of bids submitted by suppliers (the exception being search, since inviting a supplier to bid in 
the auction will increase the likelihood that that supplier will bid and hence increase the number of 
bids, ceteris paribus). At the same time, the number of submitted bids during the auction should in-
fluence the use of the ex post tactics, as the buyer will be inclined to reduce the evaluation costs 
when many bids are received. If we look at the correlation table in the Appendix, we find a small 
negative correlation between the number of bids and project description length, whereas attached 
files and budget announcement are uncorrelated with the number of bids, thus providing partial 
support for our interpretation. With regards to the employment of ex-post tactics, the correlation 
table in Appendix 1 shows, the use of Negotiation and Declined bids is positively correlated with the 
number of submitted bids. Together these results provide some, although not entirely conclusive, 
evidence for our interpretation of the tactics having a component aimed at reducing evaluation 
costs. 
 
5.2. Limitations  
Several issues need to be addressed that concern the assumptions underlying the theoretical discus-
sion; the use of measurement proxies; and alternative explanations.  
In line with previous literature on evaluation costs (Barua et al., (1997) and Snir and Hitt (2003)), the 
hypotheses of this study rely on an assumption that the use of cost-reducing tactics has negligible 
costs compared to the costs of bid evaluation. As our empirical investigation did not produce any 
evidence that extensively describing RFPs and negotiating with vendors results in a lower project 
allocation likelihood, which would signal increased total costs, this assumption seems plausible.  
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Another issue refers to empirical validation of the theoretical model and its underlying logic. We 
were able to empirically test the predictions about the consequences of buyer tactics for project allo-
cation resulting from evaluation costs reduction, rather than measure the evaluation costs per se. 
This is, however, a common way of theory validation in economics due to the fact that actually mea-
suring attributes such as evaluation costs is very challenging outside laboratory settings. As Lucking-
Reiley puts it: “Field tests assess the practical predictive power of a theory, since most theoretical 
assumptions in economic models are intrinsically unobservable in practice” Lucking-Reiley (1999: 
1075). 
The inability to directly test the effect on evaluation costs leaves us with a necessity to tackle alterna-
tive explanations for the obtained results. One alternative explanation has to do with buyer oppor-
tunism. The incentive behind buyer opportunism in such environment can be that instead of at-
tempting to allocate their projects with an efficient vendor at an auction, buyers can instead try to 
obtain price information and/or get free professional advice from vendors on the best way to de-
velop her project. After obtaining such information, the buyer can resort to off-market vendors and 
use it as a leverage to obtain favourable conditions for the off-market deal. One could suggest that 
investing efforts into the sourcing process by applying the identified tactics can be a sign of buyer’s 
commitment to transact at the marketplace, while an opportunistic buyer would try to avoid addi-
tional efforts and costs if he treats an auction just as an information gathering exercise. 
To address this alternative explanation, we tested our hypotheses on a sub-sample of first-time buy-
ers, where one might expect the level of opportunism to be the highest, as these buyers do not yet 
have a reputation to sacrifice. One could expect that in the sub-sample of first-time buyers the effect 
of the tactics would be higher as new buyers are trying to signal their commitment to suppliers. A 
test, however, showed that the magnitudes of the coefficients for first-time buyers are not signifi-
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cantly different from the full dataset11. This is an indication that different levels of buyer opportun-
ism are not a critical differentiator for the use of the tactics.  
Another issue worth discussing is the metrics used to account for the use of some of the tactics. For 
instance, the measurements used to capture negotiation and search might not fully account for the 
relevant buyer efforts to negotiate and search at the online marketplace. Indeed, we only trace the 
presence of invited vendors at an auction and references towards message board discussions in bids 
instead of directly measuring relevant efforts (e.g. time spent on searching in the vendor database 
and number of messages exchanged between parties). However, this only implies a stricter test of 
the underlying theoretical effects, and the actual impact of the tactics can expected to be stronger, 
rather than weaker. To provide a more comprehensive account for the use of additional buyer tac-
tics, subsequent research might use questionnaires to directly survey the buyers about the tactics they 
employed.  
Finally, our findings were obtained at a marketplace that consists mostly of small and medium com-
panies as well as freelancers. It is not certain, to what extent these findings can be generalized to dif-
ferent procurement settings and buyer categories. For example, one can expect that the sourcing be-
havior of larger companies would be more sophisticated than that of small companies. Also, further 
testing it required to find out whether these findings would be applicable across other categories of 
professional services, such as creative writing or marketing consulting. 
6. Conclusions and further research 
The evaluation costs buyers incur when assessing purchasing alternatives at online markets, especial-
ly for complex and idiosyncratic products and services, are a key factor for the outcomes and effi-
ciency of transactions (Snir et al., 2003). This study contributes to the electronic markets literature by 
providing empirical support to theoretical reasoning on costly bid evaluation by testing direct impli-
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 The detailed results are available from the authors upon request.  
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cations of existing models. This is important because the “record of direct application” of many key 
models is typically weak (Barua et al., 1997). By confirming some of the direct insights of the models 
on evaluation costs this paper helps to further connect analytical models from auction theory and 
electronic markets theory with business practice.  
We extended and tested the theory on the effects of evaluation costs on the outcomes of transac-
tions in online environment. While previous studies mostly focused on theoretical models of buyer 
behavior in which evaluation costs were completely or partially exogenous, in the present study we 
extend the theory by treating evaluation costs as an endogenous factor. We identify several tactics 
that help buyers reduce their evaluation costs at online markets for IT services, elaborate on the hy-
pothesized effects of these tactics on project allocation and carry out empirical tests on real transac-
tion data. Our findings can be grouped around two themes.  
First, we identified five distinct tactics that buyers can use to manipulate the level of costs incurred 
when evaluating vendors and vendor bids in online auctions for IT services, namely search (for ven-
dor), RFP preparation, budget announcement, negotiation and bid filtering. Extensive empirical test-
ing confirmed our hypotheses that the use of these tactics leads to a higher likelihood of project al-
location, which implies a reduction of underlying bid evaluation costs. The results are somewhat 
more nuanced for the effect of RFP description length, which is one of the proxies for RFP prepara-
tion. The length of RFP description becomes an effective means for increasing project allocation 
likelihood only above certain length threshold (10 words, in our case).  
Second, we studied how the effectiveness of cost-reducing tactics changes as buyers gain experience 
in transactions at the online marketplace. We found that buyer experience significantly interacts with 
two tactics – Budget announcement and RFP preparation. Interestingly, while buyer experience in-
creases the effectiveness of budget announcement leading to a sharper increase of allocation likelih-
ood, at the same time it decreases the effectiveness of RFP preparation.  
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There are several ways to extend and capitalize on the present research. This should be done by sep-
arately or jointly applying a number of approaches and methods, such as analytical modeling, labora-
tory experiments and field research. First, further testing of the hypothesized relationships and, es-
pecially, of the underlying evaluation cost reduction mechanisms should be carried out. This can be 
done in a laboratory setting that provides a proper environment to measure actors’ hidden attributes, 
such as the level of evaluation costs and also enables to extend the generalizability by ensuring con-
trol over interfering factors. Second, analytical modeling using auction theory can be applied to 
model buyer equilibrium behavior with regard to the use of evaluation cost-reducing tactics. A third 
avenue to extend the research should be conducting further field studies to test our findings on dif-
ferent online marketplaces and with other services areas. This will help to account for the differenc-
es in the marketplace design and control for the effect of service complexity on the role of evalua-
tion costs. 
The results of the study have substantial practical implications for all stakeholders at online market-
places. For buyers of complex and idiosyncratic IT services the discussion of the five tactics pro-
vides a guide to a more efficient purchasing behavior. By applying the discussed tactics buyers gain 
more control over the level of the evaluation costs involved in the selection process and increase the 
chances to select an efficient vendor. Increased buyer ability to cope with evaluation costs and take 
contracting decisions is beneficial for vendors, too. As the evaluation costs decrease, there is less 
chance for “perfectly acceptable bids” to be ignored just because of the high expected level of evalu-
ation costs. This leads to smaller overall efficiency loss in the sourcing process. The market makers 
also benefit from buyer’s ability to decrease evaluation costs as market makers earn more commis-
sion from realized projects. Therefore, market-makers should encourage the growth of buyer aware-
ness of the cost-reducing tactics, e.g. by promoting “best practices” for sourcing among buyers, 
making available case studies and making the use of tactics more intuitive especially for buyers who 
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lack experience. Besides, market makers should try to retain repeat buyers, as such buyers accumu-
late experience in online transactions, thereby increasing their own evaluation efficiency and contri-
buting to the overall efficiency of the marketplace. To conclude, the information on the behavior of 
market participants in online reverse auctions not only leads to more refined theory, it also “can be 
used to design better future auctions, and in and of itself may have commercial value” (Pinker et al., 
2003:1461).   
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Appendix 1. Pearson’s two-tailed correlations 
 Number 
of bids 
Project 
Value 
Auction 
Duration 
Average 
Rating 
Award Invited sup-
pliers 
Project De-
scription 
Attached 
Files 
Budget Declined Negotia-
tion 
Awarded 
projects 
Number of bids 1.000            
Project Value 0.135*** 1.000           
Auction duration 0.119*** 0.095*** 1.000          
Average rating 0.122*** -0.032*** -0.024** 1.000         
Award -0.001 -0.144*** -0.144*** 0.103*** 1.000        
Invited suppliers 0.051*** 0.077*** 0.035*** 0.016 0.014 1.000       
Project description -0.061*** 0.099*** 0.040*** -0.021** -0.017* 0.113*** 1.000      
Attached files -0.004 0.044*** -0.005 0.021 0.072*** 0.073*** .076*** 1.000     
Budget 0.010 -0.136*** -0.076*** 0.017* 0.099*** 0.004 -.033*** 0.015 1.000    
Declined 0.32*** 0.061*** 0.064*** -0.016 0.079*** 0.077*** .054*** 0.049*** -0.001 1.000   
Negotiation 0.108*** 0.000 0.011 0.047*** 0.137*** 0.040*** .014 0.022** 0.013 0.000 1.000  
Awarded projects -0.097*** -0.072*** -0.007 0.016 0.107*** -0.059*** -.047*** 0.000 -0.054*** -0.050*** 0.014 1.000 
*p<0.1, ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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